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The triumph of independence movements over colonial rule in Asia and 
Africa is another one of those metanarratives that needs to be rethought. 1 
But questioning the metanarrative does not mean that there are an infinite 
number of narratives of independence jumping around. In the world as it 
exists today, there are only so many ways to imagine what a state might look 
like, and that number appears smaller in 1992 than it did in the heady days 
thirty years go when British and French flags were coming down in one colony 
after another. Indeed, the narrowing began earlier: as the very question of 
taking over the state became a realistic possibility, nationalist leaders 
often began to channel the variety of struggles against colonial authority on 
which they had drawn--embracing peasants, workers, and intellectuals--into a 
focus on the apparatus of the state itself and into an ideological framework 
with a singular focus on the "nation." In the process, many of the possible 
readings of what an anticolonial movement might be were lost. 
This paper, focusing on Africa from the end of World War I1 to the early 
1960s. will look at two sorts of dialectics: first, between colonial states 
and nationalist movements as they shaped each other in this period and defined 
each others' options, and second, between two kinds of struggles in which 
people in colonies were involved--for social goals and for'control'of the 
state itself. These two dialectics also shaped each other: trying to defend 
their right to rule against challenges in the post-war era, imperial states 
asserted their power to superintend social and economic change--in the name of 
a universalistic notion of progress--while renouncing what was specifically 
colonial about colonial authority. For their part, nationalist movements came 
increasingly to deny the legitimacy of the social movements on whose diverse 
strengths they had initially built. What we are trying to explain is how 
Africa ended up with the kind of decolonization it for the most part got: 
politically assertive and socially conservative, regimes focused on their 
control of the coercive, patronage, and symbolic apparatus of the state 
itself, distrustful and hostile to the continued influence of non-state 
organization, hostile to the very idea of a social movement that might might 
i make claims on it. 
I will focus on one sort of social movement--labor--and on a particular 
example, the transition of the French West African labor movement from a 
class-centered, internationalist organization from roughly 1945 to 1955 to a 
nationalist organization that insisted that workers subordinate their own 
concerns, interests, and identity to the emerging national struggle. The most 
influential leader in both phases of this process was S6kou Tour6 of Guinea, 
and when he came to power in 1958; he added the coercive potential of the 
newly independent state to the argument about the relationship of class 
struggle and national struggle. The paper begins with a profound--and often 
constructive--tension between these two principles; it ends with the freezing 
of the dialectic. 
On Colonialism and Decolonization 
The metanarrative of nationalist triumph takes two forms. One, which 
can be called the narrative of social mobilization--or, by those who disparage 
it, the narrative of bourgeois nationalism--goes like this: inchoate, often 
local, resistance to colonial rule which had been evident since the conquest, 
was channeled into a unified anti-colonial movement in the years after World 
War I1 by western-educated intellectuals. Mobilizing people through a wide 
range of organizations--from ethnic associations to trade unions--and bringing 
them into modern political parties, these leaders forged a movement that 
attacked head-on the fundamentally racist construction of the colonial state 
and claimed its territory, its symbols, and its institutions to bring material 
progress and a sense of national identity to the people of each African 
colony. 3 
The second metanarrative is the revolutionary one, most powerfully 
articulated by Frantz Fanon: the anti-colonialism of western-educated 
intellectuals--and indeed of wage workers, aspiring only to become a labor 
aristocracy--was false, and the revolutionary dynamic lay in a peasantry and a 
lumpenproletariat willing to face up to the absolute denial of identity that 
colonialism necessarily entailed and to use violence to throw over the 
colonial regime.4 Fanon had little sympathy with the rhetoric of racial 
unity or the invocation of symbols of the African past which "bourgeois 
nationalists" found easy to embrace as they set themselves up as brokers 
between African "tradition" and post-colonial "modernity." His imagined 
future came out of the struggle itself: "'The last shall be first and the 
first last.' Decolonisation is the putting into practice of this sentence."' 
Both versions show nationalism subsuming all other struggles. In the 
triumphant nation, any voice for a particular interest represents divisiveness 
or a colonialist reaction. In post-colonial Africa, stolidly "bourgeois" 
regimes like the Ivory Coast and Kenya and self-proclaimed radical regimes 
born of. peasant mobilization and violence, such as Mozambique or Zimbabwe have 
shown a similar tendency to regard formal opposition and the organization of 
civil society as illegitimate; the single-party state is but one manifestation 
of this tendency. 6 
In practice, of course, governments lack any such unity or autonomy: 
they are tied into complex and subtle relations with internal social groupings 
and are in constant dialogue with the "western" world. Governing elites--and 
the peoples they govern--are trying to define their own politics, their own 
networks, their own identifying symbols in a world whose spatial boundaries 
are constantly being cut across and rebuilt. But official ideologies focused 
on the integrity of the nation and the singularity of its mission to define 
its people's identity and build their future cannot speak to the dilemmas and 
complexities which the state's porousness implies. Nor can they open up a 
wide debate on the unresolved problems of what the state can and cannot do to 
reform poor and unequal societies. 
The metahistories of decolonization imply particular readings of 
colonialism itself. The first version accepts the image of progress 
associated with western education, but insists that the colonial enterprise 
was fundamentally hypocritical, denying a role in bringing about that progress 
to those among the colonized who were best adapted to the task. Racism and 
foreign exploitation were the key charges levelled against the colonizers. 
The second version sees colonialism as destructive at every level. Fanon in 
particular psychologizes the problem of colonialism: he posits an archtypical 
colonial subject whose very personality is attacked by the fact of 
colonization, so that the colonized can only see themselves in relation to the 
colonizer. 7 
This psychologizing enterprise is deeply problematic. It works by 
identifying a social and political process--the domination of one country over 
another--with individual experience, and subsumes the multidimension 
structures within which and against which people acted into a singular, 
essentialized category. Colonialism itself becomes an actor. But why a 
modestly prosperous cocoa farmer in the Gold Coast, in whose life a white 
person almost never appears but who is very much subject to the structural 
constraints of the colonial economy, should be affected in the same way as a 
worker on an Algerian settler's farm--who is subject to the daily humiliation 
of racialized work discipline--is not obvious. Nor is it clear why the ways 
in which colonial subjects make use of, say, Christian religious symbols and 
practices in building religious movements out of combinations of elements that 
are original and creative should be treated as a pathological reaction to 
colonial domination. Nor is it obvious that the western-educated African is 
the pathetic figure Panon sees: he or she may be using the symbols of 
European domination in a calculated, instrumental way, or may be acting as a 
creative cultural bricoleur. The idea that the colonized subject is obsessed 
by the fact of colonialism--and builds his or her self around the model or the 
negation of the supposedly Western subject--centers colonialism more than it 
( -  should. This is a difficulty not only for Fanon's argument, but for the huge 
literature that roups African (and other) political action under the rubric 
of "resistance." % 
What colonial powers were more consistently able to do was to shape the 
terms through which colonized subjects addressed a wider world, crossing the 
bounds of communities within colonies or reaching into the institutions of the 
colonial state and the metropole themselves. How colonization shaped 
different discourses, in different spheres of interaction, has been the 
subject of much recent scholarship on the subject. Much of this work has 
tended to break down monolithic views of colonialism. Whereas some 
colonists wanted to create an abject, obedient colonial servant--who would for 
example work on plantations or in mines--others sought to "colonize minds" in 
a more active way, to reshape the way Africans thought about themselves and 
their futures. l o  The very fact of treating the resident of a mission as an 
individual. detached from a web of social connection, the very fact of 
reifying a complex and flexible pattern of group identity by writing 
dictionaries of "tribal languages" and creating institutions of "indirect 
rule," shaped the terms in which Africans, as individuals and as members of 
collectivities, had to behave in daily life. But much of this scholarship 
has been much more persuasive in showing what kinds of identities and ideas 
missionaries, teachers, traders, and administrators tried to "inscribe" on 
colonial subjects than in showing how such individuals actually thought of 
themselves. 
Some of the most interesting writing on colonialism has come out of the 
self-styled Subaltern Studies school centered in India. Their work is a 
reaction not only against elite nationalism but also against a Marxism which 
reduces the colonial subject to a stick figure in a drama written elsewhere. 
This body of scholarship has sought to uncover the structures of dominance 
- that bound subalterns to Indian elites and to the British empire, the ways in 
which British and Indian elite power were articulated with each other, and the 
origins of insurgency among the subalterns. As the manifesto of Ranajit Guha 
puts it, the starting point of analysis is the "autonomous" domain of the 
subaltern and the goal is to show people acting "on their own."" 
The problem here is the concept of sublalterity itself. It is not clear 
that the subjectivity of subalterns (or of elites) is actually theirs. The 
assumption of a neat boundary between subalterns (however defined) and elites 
(however defined) is questionable, as is the notion that the very terms in 
which dominance is articulated, by colonizers or indigenous elites, exists 
prior to their interaction with the supposedly dominated. 12 
Much of what we know about colonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa suggests 
that the terms in which "colonial hegemony," if one wants to use such a term, 
was articulated arose from the colonial encounter itself and had to be 
redefined periodically. 
Colonial rule in most of the continent was rule-on-the-cheap, probably more so 
than its architects wanted it to be. In the early colonial era, colonizers 
took on various projects of social reform--such as efforts to build a 
proletariat--but with only occasional and minimal success. It was after their 
failure to create the African worker or the African capitalist that colonial 
powers began to congratulate themselves on their genius at preserving African 
societies while slowly changing them from within. The much celebrated policy 
of "indirect rule" in British Africa--and its less talked about equivalent in 
French Africa--represented an attempt to call retreat a policy. 13 
Despite the cultural work that colonial regimes undoubtedly did, it 
strains the concept of hegemony to apply it here. The rituals of power 
focused on the state itself were largely conducted for the benefit of its 
agents, as well as white settlers, missionaries, resident traders, and--of 
course--the folks back home. Indeed, keeping overseas colonials within the 
fold--preventing them from "going native" or from blurring the sexual 
boundaries of colonizer/colonized with racially mixed offspring or from 
crossing an imagined line of colonial respectability--became a virtual 
obsession of colonial regimes from the late nineteenth century onward. This 
is an indication that the outward face of the colonizer's superiority did not 
mechanically flow from the fact of conquest but had to be reproduced 
continually and vigilantly. l 4  Colonial regimes, to be sure, tried to awe 
the populace--building modernist capital cities, staging elaborate ceremonies- 
-but it is not clear in what circumstances the populations in question found 
them awesome, as opposed to, for example, silly. Nor is it clear that 
colonial efforts to define clear borders or to set up well-defined categories 
by which the behavior of the "natives" could be understood was as meaningful 
in Africa as it was to the consumers of colonial cartography and ethnography 
back home. 15 
None of this takes away from the terrorism of King Leopold's rubber 
collectors in the Congo, the bureaucratized brutality of the labor system of 
South Africa, or the humiliations to which aspiring African clerks in 
bureaucracies were continuously exposed, but it does raise the question of 
whether a concept like "the colonized subject" is discerning enough to tell us 
very much about the exercise of power in colonies. 
We cannot understand colonial violence without realizing that--unless it 
could call on the human and economic resources of a South Africa--it was 
directly effective only when concentrated in time and space. In between, the 
power of colonial states depended--day by day--on a patchwork of alliances. 
From the colonial center, it looked as if power depended on the subcontracting 
of authority. What ruling through "chiefs" meant in practice varied 
tremendously: to some extent chiefs were colonial creations, but to some 
extent local elites manipulated colonial officials to give them greater local 
authority than they had previously possessed. l 6  
Ideologically, in any case, the colonial state depended on the way 
authority was constructed and displayed in each of the various entities 
through which the state worked. Only gradually--and often in ways manipulated 
by chiefs and elders--did colonial states acquire the ethnographic knowledge 
necessary to understand, let alone affect, the numerous idioms in which power 
was articulated. l 7  Colonial police and armies lurked behind all this, but 
their use marked a failure of the system and was only effective if 
concentrated at a particular point. The intellectual labor of establishing 
hegemonies (in the plural) thus was done in many places and in many idioms, by 
African elites whose local knowledge was vital to the enterprise and obscure 
to the central colonial power. 
Where the demands of colonial regimes were the heaviest, where the 
social situation in which many Africans lived the most Fanonesque, the 
regime's reliance on indigenous intermediaries was paradoxically the most 
acute. John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman have made this clear in the case of 
Kenya: the settler regime, drawing labor out of Kenyan communities, relied on 
chiefs to do the work, and thus depended on the opportunity for chiefs to 
develop their own mechanisms of accumulation. In Kenya and elsewhere, 
excessive demands--as for forced labor--on chiefs risked undermining their 
legitimacy and was a major. reason why colonial governments sometimes pulled 
back from rigorous recruitment efforts. At times, they had to pull back from 
the chiefs they had built up, when their overzealous subimperialism threatened 
to inspire resistance that might imperil the greater imperial good. '* 
Inevitably, officials' need to convince themselves of the merits of 
L their program of subcontracted authority and legitimation compounded their 
anxieties about budding groups that fell outside their boundaries and which 
often received the label "detribalized." These included mission converts and 
educated Africans--the very minds imperial powers seemed to be colonizing--and 
wage laborers, the necessary condition of a capitalist future. At the same 
time, it is important to emphasize that the chiefly authority being supported 
was only in the loosest sense "traditional": the vaguest bonds of linguistic 
or cultural commonality were often institutionalized into political units that 
had never before existed; changing political and cultural relations of the 
nineteenth century were often frozen into bounded territories, gazetted power 
structures, and newly defined "ethnicities. t t  19 
Colonlal Authority Challenged 
By the 1920s, French and British policy makers had turned the reformable 
"other" of the days of conquest into a frozen being whose otherness colonial 
governments now claimed to protect. Yet they had created a system vulnerable 
to challenges in precisely those areas they did not want to think about. 
However uneven and unimpressive efforts to build imperial economies in Africa 
were, colonial regimes had created islands of wage labor production--mines in 
Northern Rhodesia, farms in Kenya--as well as nodes on commercial networks, 
through which cash crops produced by peasant farms and the narrow range of 
European commodities sold by European firms, passed. Islands of wage labor 
and constricted commercial pathways were subject to disruption by relatively 
small numbers of wage laborers: 4,000 dockers in Mombasa, for example, held 
the import-export economy of Kenya and Uganda in their rough hands. 
Colonial regimes were able to diffuse the strains of the Depression of 
the 1930s into the countryside, but the revival of export production 
reconcentrated African labor and led to the first wave of strikes in the 
Copperbelt and in some railroad and port centers. In much of British Africa, 
World War XI--when Britain had little to supply to African workers and much to 
demand of them--led to endemic labor crisis, forcing officials to raise wages 
and more importantly to think seriously for the first time about the category 
of labor. French Africa caught up soon after the war ended, in a period when 
exports were increasing, labor forces were growing, and urban inflation was 
rampant. 20 
But the continued strike wave took place in a changed political and 
economic context. France and Great Britain, their economies in shambles and 
their ability to sell their own products for foreign exchange cruelly limited, 
saw their tropical colonies as the only way they could save the franc, the 
pound, and national autonomy from the new hegemon on the international 
horizon, the United States. India was going, Indochina was threatened, 
officials said in so many words that Africa was their great hope, its 
underdeveloped state itself a sign of how much its productive capacity could 
be improved. Ideologically, the great war against conquering tyrannies--and 
the language of "self-determination" which was not on the face of it confined 
to whites only--put colonial powers on the defensive, and the Soviet Union was 
eager to attack colonialism while the United States was less than eager to 
defend it. 
In this context, the two leading colonial powers had to articulate a 
compelling justification for what they were doing in the colonies. The idea 
of "development" simultaneously promised that Africa would make an enhanced 
contribution to global production--saving the empires--and that Africa would 
receive the benefits of the technical knowledge and newfound ability to plan, 
as well as whatever capital these powers could afford to invest. The 
strikes were both a disruption of the economic project and an embarrassment to 
the ideological one. They represented a telling instance of the "powerless" 
making the "powerful" reconfigure both ideology and the apparatus of 
government. Both governments thought that "development" would be a framework 
they could control. French officials, in particular, thought that an infusion 
of capital, planning, and technical assistance would be compatible with 
allowing African societies to evolve in their own milieu, without the dangers 
of proletarianization. That was not to be. The post-war strikes in French 
Africa, notably the two-month long strike movement in Senegal in 1946 and the 
five-month long railway strike throughout French West Africa in 1947-48, 
forced French officials to catch up with their British fellow-colonialists and 
come to grips with the labor question. 
What both governments found was that the subcontracted power structure 
and the subcountracted hegemonies they had elaborately constructed in rural 
Africa meant nothing in the workplace. The perceived loss of control had a 
double effect on the exercise of power in colonial regimes in this critical 
conjuncture: first, African action helped to change the makeup of colonial 
bureaucracies. It diminished the once-dominant provincial administrators who 
knew their natives and had long tried to keep Africans inside their "tribal" 
categories in favor of a rising generation of technocrats whose interventions 
were rooted in the universalities of European social engineering. Labour 
Officers and Inspecteurs du Travail became key actors. Second, the need to 
reassert control in mines, railways, ports, and cities forced officials much 
further down the road to a new--and unified--hegemonic project than they may 
have wanted to go, and toward a closer ef-fort to articulate that project with 
the intimacies of actual social life. Trying to think of ways to get Africans 
back to work, officials turned to the precedents they thought they knew: the 
efforts to tame class conflict in Europe itself. 
The ideological journey from the peculiarity of the African to the 
universality of the worker was a surprisingly fast one; the Governor-General 
of French West Africa, for one, made it in weeks, with the help of one of 
those social engineering specialists sent from Paris when the Dakar general 
strike began in January 1946. 2'  Initially, colonial officials were 
constrained from using their most obvious old weapon--the colonial army-- 
because of their belief that Africans were a naturally rural people and that 
wage workers would desert the city if handled too roughly. The brutality of 
colonial regimes in the 1940s and 1950s--beyond the occasional detention of 
"agitatorsw--was largely. reserved for people whose dissidence could be 
conceptualized as atavistic and whose actions invoked the spectre of the 
dangerous violence of primitive people, as in the terror unleashed against 
rural rebels in Madagascar in 1947 and Kenya in 1952. As long as strikers 
kept up a modernist form to their resistance, they were treated with caution; 
the fear that they might desert and the hope that they might act like modern 
workers were inducements to colonial restraint. 
The alternative chosen was to try to create--quickly--the industrial 
relations machinery used in Europe. Officials suddenly came to think trade 
unions were a good idea since an orderly process of negotiation could be 
carried out with them.li The idea of masses of cheap labor power circulating 
among jobs and between workplace and village lost its appeal, for it was this 
seemingly amorphous nature of an urban labor force which was blamed for the 
fact that strikes rapidly became general strikes. Officials set about 
attaching workers to particular occupational categories, and fracturing the 
almost uniform low level of wages through substantial raises to workers in the 
most vulnerable sectors. They began to talk of "stabilization," of making a 
career, not just a few months of employment, attractive to African workers. 
And officials soon began to think that the labor force had to be 
reproduced in a different way. The old model of the worker--and officials 
thought almost exclusively about male workers--as a single man who need only 
be paid an individual subsistence, leaving the costs of maintaining 
households, raising children, and caring for anyone not actually at work to a 
village economy increasingly peopled by women--seemed to be reproducing the 
wrong kind of workforce. Now, they wanted workers to be socialized and 
acculturated to urban life and industrial discipline Jrom childhood. As a 
Kenyan report put it, "We cannot hope to produce an effective African labour 
force until we have first removed the African from the enervating and 
retarding influences of his economic and cultural background. "23 
As the drive to turn the African worker from unruly primitive into 
industrial man accelerated in the late 1940s. colonial officials' 
conceptualization of the "traditional" Africa took on harsher overtones. Such 
an African was no longer a quaint figure whose well-being and cultural 
integrity the wise colonial ruler was to maintain, but an obstacle to 
progress. It was no accident that the late 1940s and 1950s witnessed some of 
the most brutal attacks on "atavistic" Africans even as officials were 
treating "modern" forms of resistance with considerable caution.24 The quest 
for the modern African was not limited to the field of labor--cautious 
attempts to bring select Africans into European-modelled political 
institutions were being made, and a wave of efforts to remake African 
agriculture in the names of the scientific disciplines of agronomy and animal 
husbandry were being made. - But the labor question struck in the most visible 
and vulnerable parts of empire, and forced officials to come to grips with the 
concrete realities of Africans acting in ways that transcended the old 
boundaries of control. 
The discourse described above represented an effort to reassert control. 
Organized around a single vision of progress in a European image, focused on 
specific institutions and practices, it represented a hegemonic project 
couched in universalistic language. But even before the notions of 
stabilization and reproduction had been fully spelled out, African labor 
leaders were trying to seize the discourse. They turned a language of social 
engineering into a language of entitlement, seizing on the desperate hope of 
officials that Africans would behave in predictable ways to claim that wages 
and benefits should also be determined on a European model. 
From Working Class to Nation: Trade Unionism in French Africa 
The skill of union leaders in turning the'developmental discourse of the 
French government into claims to entitlements emerged in the first major post- 
war strike movement, in Senegal in 1946. At one bargaining session, a union 
leader left his opposites speechless by asserting, "Your goal is to elevate us 
to your level: without the means, we will never succeed. "25 The combination 
of demands placed within the discursive formation French officials were trying 
to promote and the discipline of an effective general strike won substantial 
gains and gave unions confidence to demand more. Officials tried to expand 
the wage hierarchy, dividing workers by occupation and rank, but the victories 
of some encouraged others to try, while the fledgling organizations of workers 
focused demands on the state itself for a "code du travail" which would set 
minimum standards of wages and working conditions for all wage workers. 
This was also a demand officials thought paralleled their own desire for 
a clear map--based on French labor codes--of what industrial relations were 
supposed to be. Such a code had to apply to'workers of all races, unless 
France wished to undermine its own claim it was making in response to critics 
of its empire that Overseas France was an integral part of France itself, and 
that raised the stakes of the debate over how the universal worker would be 
defined. Business groups saw the danger, but could not jetison either the 
rhetoric of imperial unity--depending as they did on the protection of the 
colonial state--or the rhetoric of regulation, for they too wanted industrial 
relations channelled into predictable directions. So they could only plead 
that the special conditions of the colonies be taken into consideration in 
drafting the code. 
Meanwhile, worker organizations began to affiliate with the rival labor 
federations into which unions in France itself were grouped, and by far the 
most popular was the Conf6deration Genhral du Travail (CGT), closely linked to 
the French Communist Party. The CGT's efforts in the colonies have been the 
subject of some scholarly debate, and the organization's claim to have 
assisted colonial proletariats has been challenged by scholars who insist that 
the CGT acted in an imperialist manner, for all its left-wing rhetoric. Irwin 
Wall, in particular, has pointed out the condescending attitude of CGT and PCF 
leaders toward colonial aspirations for self-determination and to their 
insistence that only French communists could lead colonized peoples on the 
path to socialism. In short, he argues, they missed the paramount importance 
of nationalism to the people of the colonies. 2 6 
But this argument itself assumes that an historical judgment can be 
passed on the basis of a discussion that took place in France. At the same 
time, the argument naturalizes nationalism--treating it as an inevitable drive 
toward a future of political independence, as a train that one either boards 
or misses. The argument misses the dynamics and the interactions of the 
colonial situation. Whatever the limits of the vision of CGT leaders in 
France, Africa trade unionists could use the institutions of the CGT and the 
legitimacy which it had in French politics in their own ways.27 By 
associating themselves with the CGT, African trade unionists not only let 
colonial officials think that their approach to work issues was fundamentally 
modern and progressive--modelled on France--but reminded them that claims to 
universalism could take more than one form. 
In practice, the CGT-affiliated unions in French West Africa waged a. 
number of campaigns in different colonial cities, with uneven but significant 
success, for higher wages and other benefits, while they developed a French- 
West-Africa-wide organization to mobilize politically for the Code du Travail. 
The.CGT unions insisted throughout the late 1940s and 1950s that their 
fundamental oal was "equal pay for equal work," and indeed equal benefits for 
equal work. 2 f 
-- Given the universalistic, non-racial definition of the wage laborer, the 
costs of whatever guarantees workers won could be high. The elevated stakes 
of the debate over the Code du Travail caused it to drag on for six. years, 
until November 1952. Its final passage in fact came after a one-day, highly 
effective general strike throughout French West Africa, organized by all the. 
trade union federations and spearheaded by the CGT. The code guaranteed all 
wage workers a forty-hour week. paid vacations, and other benefits; it 
guaranteed the right to organize unions and, with certain restrictions, the 
right to strike; it created consultative bodies in the state apparatus with 
union representation. It did all this for a strictly bounded work force--wage 
laborers only. So called "customary laborw--which included most labor done by 
women as well as most of the forms of labor on African farms which shaded into 
tenancy--was left to an African world which officials did not have to probe. 
This was a realm, in fact, within which several leading African politicians, 
like L6opold Senghor and F6lix Houphouet-Boigny were building political 
machines, and they were quite content to keep the Inspecteurs du Travail from 
asking too many questions there. 
The African deputies to the French National Assembly in Paris had played 
an active role in the debate, and their threats to drop their support for the 
Code if certain provisions which they cherished were 1eft.out had swayed some 
metropolitan politicians who feared polarization and a new strike wave. 
This was the high point of cooperation between the leaders of African 
political parties and the trade unions. Earlier, the leading political 
activists had retained a certain distance from the labor movement: Lamine 
Gueye, then the leading Socialist politician in Dakar, had all but sat out the 
1946 strike and had accordingly earned the contempt of the strikers. Senghor 
and Houphouet-Boigny had at times seemed more concerned with the damage the 
railway strike of 1947-48 was doing to commerce than with helping the 
railwaymen achieve victory, and Houphouet-Boigny was credited by the French 
labor inspectors with persuading the railwaymen in his territory, the Ivory 
Coast, to give up the strike two months before the rest of the workers 
settled. Houphouet-Boigny remained distrustful of the labor movement, 
although Senghor, after the railway strike, moved to bring its leaders into 
his party's orbit, pushing Ibrahima Sarr, the hero of 1947-48, into an elected 
office. But in the strike wave of 1946-48, it was clear that electoral 
mobilization and labor mobilization were two processes, with considerable 
tension between them. 29 After the victory of 1952, the tension would soon 
become manifest again. 
The most interesting figure in this regard is S6kou Tour6 of Guinea. He 
had been a humble clerk in the French bureaucracy and made his start in a 
civil servants' union. He became leader of the Guinean national federation of 
CGT unions and led a bitter general strike, largely over the government's 
setting of the minimum wage, in 1950. This gave him a reputation throughout 
CGT circles, and he was one of the prime movers behind the strike of November 
1952 for the code. He more than anyone stood in the early 1950s for CGT trade 
unionism: aggressive tactics, detailed demands for one after another of the 
perquisites enjoyed by French workers, and the rhetoric of proletarian 
internationalism. He was a true "c6g6tiste. "" There were curious sides to 
his political persona even then: outside of union matters, he cooperated with 
the more conservative Houphouet-Boigny, and within the CGT he was a rival of 
the Soudanese leader Abdoulaye Diallo, who had the inside track in 
internationalist circles, having become a Vice Prcsident of the leftist World 
Federation of Trade Unions. 31  But at the time of victory in the struggle for 
the Code, S6kou Tour6' seemed fully committed to making the French working 
class the reference point for the aspirations of African workers. When the 
Code was voted, he directed his union leaders, "R6sponsable. your bedside. 
reading is the Code du Travail, which you can never study enough. ,, 32 
When business interests tried to stall jmplementation of key provisions 
of the Code and the government temporized, another French West Africa-wide 
strike movement materialized, while in Guinea S6kou Tour6 led a strike lasting 
67 days and resulting in acceptance of the labor movement's interpretation 
that a key article of the code entitled workers to a twenty per cent increase 
in the minimum wage. This strike, officials admitted, was a "remarkable 
personal success" for S6kou ~ o u r 6 . ~ ~  He took a less personal interest--but 
the CGT and other union forces were in any case well prepared--in the next 
great campaign culminating in 1956, this time for family allowances for wage 
workers. By then, strike threats were sufficiently intimidating to get the 
government to make the necessary concessions before the scheduled strike took 
place. 3 4 
But already the politics of African trade unionism were shifting, with 
Sekou Tour6 leading the new direction as he had,led the old. In 1953, the 
year of his triumph in the ~uinea strike, S6kou Tour6 ran for the Territorial 
Council, the principle legislative body at the level of the individual colony. 
He was not the only trade unionist to realize that labor offered a launching 
platform for,politics, but that it was no more than that. In fact, the 
precision with which the Code du Travail defined the working class-.-and the 
partial success of union efforts at raising wages and government efforts at 
stabilizing the labor force--meant that the population with a direct interest 
in labor's success was narrower than it might have been in the days of the 
amorphous laboring mass. Houphouet-Boigny was explicit in downplaying workers 
as a political base; the relatively well off farmers who constituted his own 
base may not have been more numerous, but their networks of tenancy, 
clientage, and affiliation penetrated much more deeply into the Ivory Coast's 
rural p~pulation.~~ S6kou Tour6 seems to have begun by following Houphou6tts 
tutelage in his political career, and in those years he kept his union 
activity compartmentalized so as not to antagonize his patron. 3 6 
Herein, I think, lies the best way for understanding the shift in the 
French labor movement from a predominantly internationalist ("c6g6tisteW) 
'orientation to a nationalist one. Most writing on the subject of the anti- 
metropolitan turn among African trade unionists don't congider any explanation 
necessary: the nationalism of the African masses is self-evident. But there 
is not much evidence that this turn originated among the rank-and-file. There 
is, on the contrary, evidence that the shift came from above, from labor 
leaders anxious to enter the political arena, and that as they did so, the 
autonomist labor movement they had spawned itself became subject to rank-and- 
file pressures for old-style demands, for higher wages and for equality with 
metropolitan workers. For someone like S6kou Tour6, electoral support 
required mobilizing people of diverse interests through multiple networks of 
organization and affiliation and finding a language of broad appeal. The 
languge of the labor movement had, since the war, urged African workers to 
cast their gaze toward French workers, and demand entitlements accordingly. 
It was, of course, filled with attacks on colonialists, but above all on 
colonialists who had not lived up to the assimilationist and universalistic 
rhetoric of French imperialism. The peasant or pastoralist in.rura1 Guinea 
had no French person whose entitlements he or she could conceivably imagine, 
let alone claim; yet peasants and'pastoralists had much in the structure of 
colonial society to feel constricted by. The common denominator of the groups 
a budding politician in the early 1950s could mobilize was not equality, but 
resentment of colonial authority. 
It was thus while workers were still engaged in struggles for equal 
wages and family allowances that some labor leaders in FWA began to try to 
disaffiliate their organizations from their metropolitan connections and turn 
them into truly African organizations. What is of particular interest here is 
what French officials made of it, for it reveals not only the tensions among 
Africans over the contradiction of nationalist and social agenda, but the way 
in which French thinking about their own exercise of power was being 
transformed in dialogue and confrontation with African organizations. A t  
first glance, one might guess that French officials would reject out of hand 
the autonomist position, for it negated every premise of post-war imperial 
ideology. In the immediate post-war years, officials had seemed to see 
something positive in the CGT for affirming that French standards provided a 
model for African aspirations. But by 1954 or 1955, officials were not so 
sure--for the CGT had been far too successful using this rhetoric--and 
officials greeted the autonomist surge in the labor movement with something 
akin to relief. As the chief Inspecteur du Travail commented, 
[The C.G.T. leaders] have succeeded in trapping the public powers 
and rival union confederations in a kind of cycle that one can 
break out of only with great difficulty. If in effect one 
satisfies demands, these serve as a point of departure for new, 
more elevated demands, which threaten at this pace to break open 
the structure of the country and lead to a crisis, with 
unemployment, misery, discontented masses... 3 7 
Even earlier, French officials had thought that S6kou Tour6 might lead a 
nationalist exodus from the CGT, and they had welcomed the possibility. They 
were premature, but kept hoping. 38 And in 1955, open confrontation burst out 
between S6kou Tour6, who insisted that the French CGT and the WFTU were out of 
touch with "African realities," and Abdoulaye Diallo, who heaped contempt on 
"so-called African trade unionism. "39 Meanwhile, African politicians were 
calling for a specifically African trade unionism that would work alongside 
African political parties. The feuding gave rise to a new federation, the 
Confederation Gbn6rale du Travail--Autonome (CGTA), independent of the French 
CGT. The loyalists--thinking the autonomists were playing into the hands of 
the Government--promptly dubbed the new organization "CGT--Administrative." 
French officials in fact were pleased over the split, although worried that 
lest the new organization be too successful and reestablish unity on a 
different basis. 40 The non-communist federations also went through a similar 
process, with most forming specifically African federations independent of the 
metropolitan centrales. In 1 9 5 7 ,  most of these organizations decided to 
combine forces in a single trade union federation that would express 
aspirations to African unity. It became known as the Union G6nerale des 
Travailleurs dlAfrique Noire (UGTAN). 
S6kou Tour6 became the most articulate spokesman of the new African 
trade unionism. He argued that the fundamental issue was African unity in the 
struggle against imperialism. The old rhetoric of equality, like that of 
class struggle, was gone. Indeed, Si5kou Tour6 insisted, "Although the classes 
of metropolitan and European populations battle and oppose each other, nothing 
separates the diverse African social classes." Because of the common identity 
of Africans, there was no need for a pluralit of trade unions. The claim to 
unity and uniformity came in the same breath.'' UGTAN debated the issue of 
class struggle, and refused a proposal that the organization act not only 
against "white colonialism, but also against Africans who exploit their racial 
brothers, like the planters of the Ivory Coast." Instead, delegates--with 
considerable unease and disagreement--insisted that the liquidation of 
colonialism should "take pride af place over the class struggle. v 4 2  In 
secret, French officials welcomed the new direction in African trade unionism: 
"the movement could a priori be considered--and it has not failed to be this 
in effect--as favorable to our future in Africa. ,143 
In 1956 the context in which the African struggles for power and for 
social justice intersected underwent a dramatic change. The French 
government, frustrated in its efforts to shape economic and social change in 
its own way, fearing a second Algeria, and seeking to distance itself from all 
the demands for parity that followed from its assimilationist and universalist 
imperial ideology, pulled back. Developmentalist thinking, in the end, did 
not offer an answer to the question that had bedevilled Africa's conquerors 
for over sixty years: how to harness the recources and labor power of the 
continent. 4 4  The French Government redefined political institutions under 
the loi cadre, devolving effective government (except for foreign affairs, 
defense, etc.) to the individual territories, operating under elected 
legislatures, a "Vice-Pr6sident du Conseil" chosen by the party controlling 
the legislature, and African Ministers. Most decisions and budgets were 
devolved from the federations (French West Africa and French Equatorial 
Africa) to the territories (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger, etc.). 
France made it clear that the civil service in each territory, with 
certain transitional provisions, would be the responsibility of each 
government; if government workers were to get any more perquisites the 
territorial legislatures would have to raise the money to pay for them. The 
effect of this was to put the French reference point at one remove from 
African civil servants and workers. The civil service unions realized quickly 
that "territorialization" threatened the rhetorical and institutional basis 
for all their demands. But the tide was against them: African politicians 
were eagerly seeking the legislative and executive offices, and trade union 
leaders were prominent among them. 
French officials thought they had got themselves out of the trap their 
own rhetoric and CGT organization had got them into. As one political 
observer noted, as soon as trade union leaders won office they would be in the 
same position as their French predecessors in facing workers' demands for new 
entitlements, and--having to pay the bills--they would offer "meager 
satisfaction. Workers would be held in check by "their respectful fear of 
local African authorities, who will not lack the means of make their point of 
view prevail. "45 It would now be African trade unionists who would fall into 
a trap baited by their own nationalism and sprung by the takeover of state 
institutions by ambitious men of power. 
. French officials guessed right: as African politicians, including those 
of trade union background, moved into state offices, they would seek to tame 
the labor movement. Trade union leaders did well in the 1957 elections. In 
eight of the nine territories of FWA, trade union leaders were named Minister 
oC Labor or Minister of the Civil Service, and seven of these eight were UCTAN 
members. S6kou Tour6 became Vice-president du Conseil in ~ u i n e a . ~ ~  And the 
level of strike activity in fact went down, while UGTAN itself intervened to 
cool off some strike movements. This soon led to considerable tension from 
the rank-and-file, whose interests in the old demands of equality with French 
workers, higher minimum wages, better benefits, and guarantees against the 
loss through territorialization of already-won rivileges were now threatened 
by the very success of anti-colonial politics. 47 
S6kou Tour6, as he moved toward power, told trade unionists that they 
would have to fall in line to express the unity of the African personality and 
the unity of the anti-imperialist struggle. A strike against "the organisms of 
colonialism" was one thing., . : 
But when it is directed against an African Government, it affects 
African authority, reenforcing by this means, in the relations of 
force established between the dependent power and the dominant 
power the authority of the latter . . . .  Trade unionism for trade 
unionism's sake is historically unthinkable in current conditions, 
trade unionism of class just as much . . .  The trade union movement 
is obligated to reconvert itself to remain in the same line of 
48 emancipation. . 
His Minister of Labor, Camara Bengaly, also lectured trade unionists on their 
new duties: 
The workers, without renouncing any of their rights but convinced 
of the necessity to use them in good earnest, will go through a 
reconversion to become the precious collaborators of the elected 
authorities of the people and more particularly of the young 
Conseil de Gouvernment in its mission to realize the happiness of 
all Guineans through work done in love . . . .  [Tlhe orientation of 
our trade union movement must necessarily correspond to the 
general policies desired by our populations. Any conception of 
trade unionism contrary to this orientation must be discarded, and 
courageously fought in order to be eliminated definitively. 49 
Coming on the eve of Guinean independence, the words were chilling. The 
assertions that Africans were an undivided people, that Africans now ruled 
themselves, and that Africans were engaged in an ongoing struggle with outside 
forces would be used to ensure that,Africans spoke with a single voice. One 
of S6kou Tour6's collaborators and rivals in years of trade union action, 
David Soumah, already understood the implications: 
A unity which stifles the voice of free trade unionism sets back 
the emancipation of the laboring masses instead of facilitating 
it. A unity which ends up in reality in subordinating trade union 
action to the good will of governments and employers, which 
sudmits trade unionsm, the very expression of liberty, to a too 
narrow obedience toward political parties and political men, 
neutralizes the action of the masses for social progress. 5 0 
S6kou Tour6 practiced what he preached. He led Guinea out of the French 
empire in 1958 and duly set about consolidating his personal authority and 
those of his henchmen, repressing--among other groups--any vestige of 
autonomous trade unionism. In the end, he was a better repressor than anti- 
imperialist, and he had to give foreign corporations attractive concessions to 
Guinea's bauxite mines in order to stave off the utter collapse of his 
miserable economic system. 5 1 
There was, of course, a case to be made that African trade unionists had 
done well enough in the final years of colonialism that they should have 
exercised restraint in the early years of independence, but the Guinean 
government was not asking for restraint. They were declaring that Unity had 
arrived. The tensions of social justice and political autonomy are real 
enough; they could, in theory, have been recognized within the political 
arena. S6kou Tour6's version of anti-imperialism--and other regimes similarly 
posited "development" as a national goal which noone could legitimately 
oppose--denied the very possibility of a dialectic.52 The unified people 
would carry on its unified struggle; the police, the jailor, and the 
executioner would also play their roles. The nightmare of many Africans after 
decolonization was not so far from Fanon's dream: in declaring the first to 
be last, S6kou Tour6 and his fellows denied the complexity of Africa's past 
and present and the possibility of legitimate debate over where, between first 




Looking back on the moment in 1957 when Africans were first entering 
ministerial office in French West Africa, there is something strange and 
revealing about the way the "colonizers" and the "colonized" were portraying 
their own actions. French administrators were congratulating themselves on 
having found a way to end the cycle of demands that trade union organization 
and French imperialist rhetoric had unleashed: they would give up power to 
Africans. African leaders were perfecting rationales for repressing, more 
vigorously than the colonial regime, social movements of the sort from which 
they had sprung. The colonizers could no longer see themselves as very 
colonial; the self-conscious leaders of the colonized were taking over the 
colonial state's claim to define the meanings of progress and legitimacy. 
Both sides seemed to hope--vainly it turned out--that the authoritarianism of 
the latter would be more effective than that of the former. 
What French officials were then discovering is that knowledge is not 
power. They had,.over the previous decade, given up subcontracting authority 
and shed their ambivalence about France as a social model for Africa. As In 
the labor field, French city planning, French health authorities, and French 
education had come to constitute a singular mode for articulating the 
authority and legitimacy of France. As colonialism was challenged inside and 
outside Africa, the universalistic claims of developmentalism reasserted a 
metropolitan claim to reshape the most intimate social -processes--remaking 
family as well workplace--and the broadest ideological constructions. But in 
labor--as in other domains--the assertion of a scientific vision of social 
restructuring was being turned into a series of claims to entitlements, while 
the actual program of social reform was not, as officials slowly realized, 
turning the workplace, the farm, the family, or'belief systems into 
reflections of French images. Development efforts were leading to new forms 
of contestation without showing signs of making Africa into the productive 
partner of post-war colonial imagination. 
- And so by 1957, officials were thinking that the project of a 
Europeanized Africa could only be realized if they themselves stepped out of 
the picture. They put forward these ideas as if they were clever ploys for 
maintaining control. But they were turning ovef to African elected 
politicians the sites'where social change was actually in question, where 
power was brought to bear on African men and women as they worked, as they 
formed families, as they sought to educate their children, as they pondered 
what sort of life they would lead. They had, in all but name, accepted the 
fact of decolonization. 
Although had made the crucial withdraw1 from the front lines of the 
struggle to colonize minds and ways of life, they were still asserting power 
in another way, and that gave rise to the powerful but questionable label of 
"neo-colonialism." In posing the labor question (and others too) in a ' 
particular way, they had potentially set the parameters of political discourse 
even if they could not maintain control over its contents. They had enmeshed 
African trade unionists in a particular institutional and discursive 
structure--one which naturalized the capitalist workplace and the state's role 
in "industrial relations" and which defined other forms of organizing 
production as beyond the scope of legitimate political action. These 
institutions and this discourse were located not only in the administrative 
structure of the soon-to-be state, but in relations of state and union 
I . . 
bureaucracies to international organizations such as the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the ILO, the UN, and later the foreign aid 
apparatus. 
At first glance, the modernizing agenda of the post-war officials 
appears to have had lasting effects on how labor questions were framed in the 
post-colonial state. Most states in French West Africa have kept in place 
modified forms the "Code du Travail," of 1952, defining a bounded working 
class, its modern structure starkly separated from the "customary" labor 
("informal" has become the more fashionable buzz-word). Although some 
(Guinea included) have gutted the legislation of its meaning by a cruder 
assertion of administrative authority over the workplace and by the 
destruction of trade unions, others (like Senegal) have kept in place a , 
structure of industrial relations very much on the model set up in the 1950s. 
So too, African governments have attached great value to the form of the 
colonial city and colonial urban planning--downtowns, with their rectangular 
blocks and tall office buildings, have come to be a concrete, in more ways 
than one, manifestation of a Eurocentric modernism that remains potent in 
independent Africa. 
But within limits. The hegemonic project of post-war imperialism, 
passed on to post-colonial states, has become a gatekeeper's ideology. It is 
most salient at the intersection of ex-colonies with international systems. 
In taking over capital-city institutions, African governments soon learned how 
thin was the wave of "nationalism" that had carried them into office, and how 
much they had merely taken over a colonial apparatus, and a sovereignty often 
better defined by its linkage to organizations overseas than within the 
territory of the state. Some scholars have even argued that such states exist 
largely by virtue of their international recognition--their seats in the 
United Nations and above their being the locus for administering aid programs 
and as a target for IMF and World Bank  intervention^.'^ Developmentalist 
ideologies are crucial to the gatekeeper state: those are the terms in which 
aid is appealed for. The gate, of course, faces inward as well, and in a 
country, like Senegal, where foreign aid equals 14 per cent of GNP, and where 
administering the rather narrow channels through which import-export 
operations and the modest activities of multinational corporations amount to 
another lar e chunk, the gate in fact represents a potent source of jobs and 
patronage. '' But, now that the univeralistic claims of development theories 
have failed to remake economy and society, these processes serve to maintain a 
tottering apparatus rather than to form the basis for the further penetration 
of a hegemonic ideology much beyond the site of the gatekeeper's tollbooth. 
For ex-colonial powers (and their imperial partner in the United 
States), the post-war developmentalist project defines another sort of power: 
the power to label. Thus, for example, international agencies and scholars 
call that portion of the labor market which falls outside of the "Code du 
travail" or similar legislative regulation, the "informal sector." Hawkers, 
unlicensed beer brewers, self-employed artisans, workers in unregulated 
sweatshops, prostitutes, and other laborers outside of the formal subsumption 
of labor to capital fall into this category; it is not merely kncidental that 
much of what women do in African cities falls into this category. The label 
carries a belittling connotation, as a kind of lesser work of the kind which 
we in the West largely do not do.55 The people who are so labelled do fall 
victim to it in certain ways: they are not protected by labor legislation and 
they are often harassed as "illegal" operators by post-colonial governments. 
But most observers agree that this "sector" has mushroomed in most African 
countries, and in some it is by far the most dynamic and productive. Somebody 
living in the "informal sector" does not necessarily have to take the label 
seriously: social relations within it are often quite complex, flexible, even 
formal. But they are not what Marx wrote about in Capital or Clark Kerr in 
Industrialism and Industrial Man. Labelling all this "informal sector" may 
assert the power of the gatekeeper ideology, but doing so does not control its 
. spread--in some countries the "second economy" is larger than the first--or 
define what goes on within it. 
Indeed, the labelling process may well impede further understanding of 
how such labor is performed, how economic relationships are shaped, and how 
power is articulated within networks of market women or of artisans--let alone 
how these structures articulate with more "formal" forms of capitalism. 
Analyzing African societies in terms of the dichotomies of formal-informal, 
market-nonmarket ,' im'bdern-backward, governments, aid agencies and qui tc a few 
scholars frequently remain caught in the categories established in the 
struggles of the era of decolonization, unable to look at social issues in all 
their complexity and subtlety. What African governments have discovered is 
that power is not necessarily knowledge. 
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